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Abstract
France experiences catastrophic floods on a yearly basis, with significant societal impacts. 
In this study, we use multiple sources (insurance datasets, scientific articles, satellite data, 
and grey literature) to (1) analyze modern flood disasters in the PACA Region; (2) dis-
cuss the efficiency of French public policy instruments; (3) perform a SWOT analysis of 
French flood risk governance (FRG); and (4) suggest improvements to the FRG framework. 
Despite persistent government efforts, the impacts of flood events in the region have not 
lessened over time. Identical losses in the same locations are observed after repeated cata-
strophic events. Relative exposure to flooding has increased in France, apparently due to 
intense urbanization of flood-prone land. We suggest that the French FRG could benefit 
from the following improvements: (1) regular updates of risk prevention plans and tools; 
(2) the adoption of a build back better logic; (3) taking undeclared damages into account 
in flood risk models; (4) better communication between the actors at the different steps 
of each cycle (preparation, control, organization, etc.); (5) better communication between 
those responsible for risk prevention, emergency management, and disaster recovery; (6) 
an approach that extends the risk analysis outside the borders of the drainage basin; and (7) 
increased participation in FRG from local populations.
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Flooding is widely considered to exert the greatest societal impacts of all natural hazards 
(CRED-UNISDR 2015). The total amount of damage resulting from flood disasters glob-
ally is expected to rise in the future, due to long-term impacts of climate change, includ-
ing the rise in sea level (e.g., Hallegatte et al. 2013), intensification of precipitation events 
(e.g., Lenderink and Van Meijgaard 2008; Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012), and socio-eco-
nomic factors (e.g., Vedeld et al. 2016; Winsemius et al. 2016; Luke et al. 2018), such as 
expansion of urbanization (e.g., Swiss Re 2014; Miller and Hutchins 2017; Zhang et  al. 
2018; Koc and Işık 2020). Furthermore, flood losses have increased globally (e.g., Bouwer 
2011; Surminski et al. 2015; Cremades et al. 2018) and now represent the largest propor-
tion of insured losses among catastrophes induced by natural hazards; global costs were 
approximately €50 billion in 2016 alone (Aerts et al. 2018).
Since the start of the twenty-first century, numerous researchers (e.g., Hall et al. 2005; 
Lumbroso et al. 2011; Alexander et al. 2015; Mees et al. 2016) and international organi-
zations (e.g., UNISDR, Sendai Framework 2015) have attempted to address these issues 
nationally or globally by focusing on improving flood risk governance (FRG), which, 
according to Ishiwatari (2019), determines how flood risk is managed and how the costs 
and benefits of flood management are distributed within society. Furthermore, Dixit (2003) 
suggests that the vulnerability of people in risk-prone areas must be addressed by enhanc-
ing resilience, which is defined as the ability of a system, community, or society exposed 
to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a 
timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essen-
tial basic structures and functions (UNISDR 2009). Lamond et al. (2019) discuss desirable 
improvements for several sectors (e.g., access to adequate risk information, professional 
skills in evaluating risk, guidance on evaluation of flood risk), to ensure sufficient consid-
eration of risk and mitigation options. Even though impacts from flooding are dispropor-
tionately high for the poorest and most vulnerable (e.g., Jongman 2018), studies show that 
the developed world is also under threat (Kaufmann and Wiering 2017; Hudson et al. 2019; 
Miller and Hutchins 2017; Crichton 2008). For example, Paprotny et  al. (2018) indicate 
that the total urban area exposed to flooding in Europe has increased by 1,000% over the 
past 150 years.
France is one such European country that faces catastrophic flood events on an annual 
basis (Boudou et al. 2016; Larrue et al. 2016). The NatCatSERVICE (2017), which is pro-
vided by Munich Re to the European Environment Agency under institutional agreement, 
and which illustrates the impacts of extreme weather and climate-related events in the 
European Economic Area (EEA) member countries (1980–2017), ranks France as having 
had the most flood-related fatalities (from extreme weather and climate-related events) in 
Europe (approximately 23,500 over the period 1980–2017), and having had the third-great-
est total economic losses (behind Germany and Italy) and insured losses (behind Germany 
and the UK) related to flooding. Furthermore, according to Paprotny et al. (2018), while 
overall exposure to floods has declined in most European countries, notably in central and 
northern Europe, relative exposure has increased in France and other western states (i.e., 
Germany, the Netherlands), apparently because of intense urbanization processes, occupy-
ing and transforming flood-prone land. A potential 2  °C increase in global temperatures 
would likely exacerbate this problem by significantly increasing the probability (Roudier 
et al. 2016) and severity of flooding. These events could vary from tidal floods and storm 
surges in the west and north of France, to flash floods in the south and fluvial floods along 
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main rivers, as well as urban flooding in many cities (Larrue et al. 2016). Previous studies 
have focused on different phases and components of French flood risk governance (FRG), 
including flood hazard (e.g., Boudou et al. 2016; Montané et al. 2017; Evin et al. 2019); 
flood risk (e.g., Le Coz et al. 2016; Liefferink et al. 2018; Creach et al. 2020); the role of 
the government as a predominant actor in the FRG system (Larrue et al. 2016; Fournier 
et al. 2018; Fournier 2020; and the Natural Disaster Compensation Scheme (CatNat) (e.g., 
Magnan 1995; Scolobig et al. 2014; Guillier 2017), which was created in 1982 to manage 
damage compensation for extreme natural disasters based on an insurance super-fund (Bar-
raqué and Moatty 2020).
Each of these studies is valuable for its treatment of different phases of French FRG. 
However, few studies focus on the system as a whole to show the links, if any, between dif-
ferent phases of the governance cycle. Studies attempting to analyze national governance 
frameworks for different natural hazards have been developed for different countries, such 
as Thailand and the USA (e.g., Singkran and Kandasamy 2016; Tullos et al. 2016). These 
papers usually summarize the governance framework studied and suggest any appropri-
ate changes, based on the analysis of laws, policy documents, or empirical data. Another 
example is the International Risk Governance Center (IRGC) framework (2020), a govern-
ance tool that involves all stakeholders that could be affected by a risky activity or event, 
and specifies the management options taken to counter the risk. In Fig. 1, we identify the 
main phases of the integrated flood governance approach in France as described by Larrue 
et al. (2016) and the French Ministry of Ecological Transition (Ministère de la transition 
écologique) (2020).
Each main phase of the cycle (risk prevention, emergency management, and disaster 
recovery) contains multiple components (e.g., hazard, early warning, CatNat) that are 
considered simultaneously when analyzing the framework. Specifically, risk prevention 
Fig. 1  French flood risk governance (FRG) system
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involves analysis of the hazard (i.e., a flood, or knock-on effects, such as landslides), the 
vulnerability of local stakeholders (e.g., building material, age distribution, access to 
health services), and mitigation measures to be used to prevent a disaster (e.g., dikes, reten-
tion ponds). Emergency management comprises planning with scenario-making from local 
government services, response training of concerned teams (e.g., fire brigade, ambulance), 
and early warning systems (e.g., flood depth alerts). Disaster recovery is characterized by 
three criteria. The first is related to the public solidarity system, CatNat, which is triggered 
once municipalities claim that they have been affected by an exceptional event and the State 
acknowledges the claim. The second relates to private insurance companies, which provide 
additional coverage for elements not covered by the CatNat system. We can identify a third 
criterion that has appeared more recently and relates to the build back better (BBB) cul-
ture, which was first officially used in the Sendai Framework (UNISDR 2015) and focuses 
on improving land use, spatial planning, and construction standards through the recovery 
process (Noy et al. 2019). Each of these phases contains a series of steps (e.g., preparation, 
control, communication) that guarantee the appropriate operation of the FRG cycle.
Despite the resilient design of current French FRG, several deficiencies are observed 
when a flood disaster occurs. To assess the efficiency of the French FRG system, we focus 
on the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA) region in France for two reasons: (1) the 
region has suffered repeated flood disasters for approximately 30 years despite government 
prevention efforts; and (2) the incidence of flood disasters has increased in recent years, 
making an assessment of the effectiveness of public policy timely. For our analysis, we use 
multiple data sources (insurance datasets, scientific articles, satellite data, grey literature) 
with a fourfold purpose: (1) to analyze modern flood disasters in the PACA region; (2) 
to discuss the efficiency of French public policy instruments; (3) to perform a strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis of French FRG; and (4) to suggest 
improvements.
2  Extreme flooding in Provence‑Alpes‑Côte D’Azur (PACA)
2.1  Study area and past flood disasters
The PACA region in France is characterized by steep slopes and deep valleys; the coastal 
plains are enclosed by the Cévennes mountain range to the northwest and the Alps to 
the east. Summer drought and intense autumn rainfall are typical features of the climate 
(Petrucci et al. 2019). Rainfall is concentrated over the period September–December (50% 
of annual total). Winter is drier with cold, continental winds. Flash floods are common in 
the region (e.g., Vinet 2008a, b; Vinet et al. 2012; Heinzlef et al. 2019), with a significant 
number of fatal historical events taking place since the creation of the CatNat national soli-
darity scheme in 1982. Some notable extreme flooding events that have provoked loss of 
life, as well as significant material costs, include the Vaison-la-Romaine floods (September 
1992), the Draguignan floods (June 2010), and the most recent Côte d’Azur floods (Octo-
ber 2015). The region has also faced smaller flood events, such as the Var and Alpes-Mari-
times floods (November 2011, November–December 2019) and the Nice floods (November 
1994, December 2005). In Fig. 2, we provide a map of the study area (PACA region) and 
of the most notable flood events.
In the last 10  years, several PACA municipalities have attempted to emphasize resil-
ience in their urban planning in response to repeated flooding (Heinzlef et al. 2019). For 
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example, Avignon is applying a holistic methodology for resilience to floods with social 
(e.g., education, insurance), technical (e.g., engineering, transport network), and urban 
(e.g., economical dynamics, environment) characteristics. The city already uses these new 
results and mapping to build an urban well-being indicator.
2.2  The October 2015 Côte d’Azur disaster
According to the official post-event report of the Préfet (regional authority) des Alpes-
Maritimes (2016), on Saturday, October 3, 2015, between 20:00 and 21:45, an exceptional 
rainfall event took place between Mandelieu-la-Napoule and Nice (for official rainfall 
maps see Météo-France1). The report also suggests that this event delivered approximately 
200 mm of precipitation in two hours and is comparable to a catastrophic event that took 
place in the same region in 1966. According to Carrega (2016), these values correspond to 
a larger than 100-year storm. More specifically, the Cannes meteorological station recorded 
175 mm of rainfall in two hours, which is approximately 80 mm more than the 100-year 
event (94.6  mm). This exceptional rainfall caused a substantial increase in surface run-
off and subsequent river discharge (> 250  m3/s, again, larger than the 100-year event), in 
the Argentière and Brague rivers. In addition, due to the region’s steep slopes, which are 
Fig. 2  Map of major flood events in PACA 
1 http:// pluie sextr emes. meteo. fr/ france- metro pole/ Catas trophe- sur- la- Cote-d- Azur. html.
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covered by Mediterranean vegetation, large pieces of woody debris were swept into water 
courses, damming the main channels and causing water to be diverted onto floodplains. 
The Préfet’s report (2016) declared that 20 people lost their life during the event and that 
1,200 people were in need of immediate disaster relief measures.
2.3  Identifying flood risk governance deficiencies after the disaster
In the years, following the October 2015 disaster, several reports were published (e.g., 
that of the Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes 2016; ARTELIA 2017; CEREMA 2019) listing a 
number of pre-existing issues that could have led to the disaster. They included inadequate 
land-use planning, inadequate prevention plans, inadequate warning systems, inadequate 
maximum threshold for emergency calls (only 20 simultaneously), the lack of appropriate 
rain forecast modelling, citizens’ ignorance of what to do after an alert is initiated (lack of 
operational knowledge), and the lack of road network mapping. These issues seem to be 
the same as the those in past local disasters (listed in Sect. 2.1). In Sects. 2.3.1–2.3.3, we 
will briefly analyze all aspects of the FRG framework in PACA (as summarized in Fig. 1) 
to observe, in detail, the pitfalls leading to repeated disasters.
2.3.1  Risk prevention
The current French FRG system is based on prevention and the main goal is to reduce 
exposure to risk through the use of legal instruments (e.g., Kaufmann and Wiering 2017; 
Fournier et  al. 2018). There are two main instruments: (1) the Plans de Prévention du 
Risque d’inondation (PPRi), which offer maps identifying areas exposed to a reference 
flood hazard (often the 100-year event) and include bans or restrictions on construction, 
depending on an area’s risk level (Barraqué and Moatty 2020); (2) the Programme d’Action 
pour la Prévention des Inondations (PAPI), which has several aims, including creating syn-
ergy and coordinating actions and actors at the prevention level and river basin scale, and 
developing a multi-year strategy that relies on the implementation of other existing public 
policy tools (Guillier 2017). According to Dubert et al. (2016), the most exposed munici-
palities with the most elevated mortality rates did have a PPRi at the time of the October 
2015 event. This is further evidenced by the insurance datasets that were provided to us, 
from experts of the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR), the Directions Régionales de 
l’Environnement, de l’Aménagement et du Logement (DREAL), and the Centre d’études 
et d’expertise sur les risques, l’environnement, la mobilité et l’aménagement (CEREMA), 
after four meetings (April 2019, July 2019, October 2019, and December 2019). The insur-
ance datasets these organizations provided illustrated that all municipalities that recorded 
fatalities (e.g., Mandelieu-La-Napoule—10 deaths, Vallauris—three deaths, Cannes—two 
deaths) had a PPRi. Furthermore, it seems that these instruments were significantly out of 
date when the disaster happened (e.g., in Cannes the last PPRi was approved in 2003).
After earlier disasters that occurred at the turn of the millennium (e.g., 1999 in the Aude 
department, 2002 in the Gard department—see Vinet 2008b), the idea that flooding is a 
controllable natural phenomenon was challenged and a focus on analysis of vulnerability 
was suggested (Vinet 2004, 2007, 2008a). Also, the effectiveness of structural measures 
began to be questioned (Kaufmann and Wiering 2017; Kron et al. 2019). During the Octo-
ber 2015 Côte d’Azur disaster, the artificial protection dikes were largely ineffective due 
to the severity of the phenomenon (with river discharges larger than the 100-year event), 
while some dikes trapped large debris, blocking the flow and worsening the situation 
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(Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes report 2016). A similar phenomenon was observed in the Sep-
tember 1992 Vaison-la-Romaine disaster. According to Ballais and Segura (1995), the pro-
tection dikes and embankments that were installed along the River Ouvèze during World 
War II, to straighten the channel in the valley and provide space for construction, intensi-
fied runoff turbulence, and transported boulders and woody debris that blocked bridges and 
promoted damage downstream.
After the October 2015 event, PACA inhabitants were promised the construction of new 
retention ponds as well as the reinforcement of mitigation measures (ARTELIA 2017). 
Flood mitigation measures such as retention ponds and wetland restoration are considered 
a viable option for flood management because they improve runoff management while 
legitimating the PAPI project, illustrating the advantages of land-based flood control (Bar-
raqué and Moatty 2020). In 2001, some years after the Vaison-la-Romaine and other flood 
disasters around France, the Assemblée Nationale (2001) published a document suggesting 
measures for regions facing repeated flood disasters, like the PACA region. It observed that 
natural retention capacity has decreased due to the disappearance of wetlands, which were 
often replaced by intensive agriculture, heavy infrastructure, and the extension of water-
proof surfaces.
Another important prevention tool is the Document d’information communal sur les 
risques majeurs, or DICRIM, a short document designed to inform the local population in 
each municipality about existing risks and different ways to protect against them. Although 
the DICRIM is produced by municipalities and has no binding authority, it is an important 
illustration of good practice in flood risk management. In short, the mayor is charged with 
informing citizens if they are exposed to major risks, after which the government indi-
cates protection measures and a municipality safety plan (Plan communal de sauvegarde, 
or PCS) designed to respond to a major disaster, should it occur. The Préfet des Alpes-Mar-
itimes report (2016) analyzed 10 DICRIMs out of the 14 municipalities that suffered in the 
October 2015 PACA disaster (four did not have a DICRIM). In three of the DICRIMs, the 
mapping was inaccurate, with several locations missing from each map. The insurance data 
provided by the Caisse Centrale de Reassurance (CCR) show that, out of 85 municipalities 
in PACA, 10 did not have a DICRIM, another 13 had an old DICRIM (i.e., last updated 
before 2010), and 62 had a new one (updated since 2010). There is another dimension to 
this problem, suggesting that when local populations are aware of local flood risks, they 
have a greater tendency to ignore safety measures and so expose themselves to even greater 
risks (Ruin and Lutoff 2007).
2.3.2  Emergency management
During the October 2015 event, there was a lack of information on flood risk, a lack of pre-
paredness to face catastrophic flooding, and no appropriate alert system in place. Accord-
ing to the Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes report (2016), the alert level, which is color-coded 
(yellow—low risk, orange—medium risk, and red—high risk), was misused. Météo-
France has triggered orange alerts on a regular basis since the creation of the system, which 
has the effect of normalizing and trivializing the severity of the orange alert level. Fur-
thermore, after observing the rainfall and discharge during the October 2015 event, the 
red alert signal should have been triggered. This was not the case, and the alert remained 
orange. Carrega (2016) highlights that inaccurate meteorological (rainfall) models fore-
casted only about 25% of the precipitation that occurred during the event, causing more 
confusion in the alert system. In addition, civilians apparently had insufficient knowledge 
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of the alert protocol and poor understanding of the alert messages, with many confused 
about the color coding. The French alert system (Vigicrues) also came under criticism dur-
ing the June 2010 Draguignan disaster, as it had not monitored the three main rivers that 
overflowed and caused damage to local communities (Sénat report 2012). Moreover, most 
hydrological stations located on the main rivers were destroyed by the flood, significantly 
limiting the capacity of researchers and decision makers to take precise discharge measure-
ments (Payrastre et al. 2012). As Martin (2010) indicates, only three stations managed by 
the Direction régionale de l’Environnement, de l’Aménagement et du Logement (DREAL) 
were undamaged in the floods.
Another important aspect that needs to be investigated relates to the presence of emer-
gency services. According to Sénat (2012), the Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes (2016) and the 
CEREMA (2019) reports, which examine the events presented in this paper (e.g., Draguig-
nan June 2010, Côte d’Azur October 2015, PACA November–December 2019) noted that, 
despite the significant number of firefighters and emergency interventions involved (e.g., 
600 firefighters and 1500 interventions in 2015), there was a lack of robust protocols for 
flood disasters. These numbers should be assessed with caution, since the insurance data 
we collected from the CCR show more than 3144 interventions in PACA, with Alpes-Mar-
itimes accounting for around two-thirds (2,094) of all interventions. According to Sénat 
(2012), local populations, government, and emergency services downplay flood risk (con-
sidering it medium risk) compared to the risk of forest fire, which leads to municipal plans 
focusing on the risk of wildfire rather than flooding. Following the October 2015 event, the 
Ministry of Environment (Ministère de l’environnement, de l’énergie et de la mer) report 
(2016) suggested that a flood information and action week should be held, in which all 
stakeholders could be involved (e.g., Météo-France, government, fire-fighters) and where 
all past events could be discussed. This type of annual workshop already exists in areas 
prone to wildfire and earthquake in France, but not yet in areas prone to flooding.
2.3.3  Disaster recovery
Recovery in the French system is mainly based on insurance. Numerous authors have 
already pointed out some of the pitfalls of the current French flood insurance system and 
suggested a shift toward a public–private partnership (PPP) mechanism offering more flex-
ibility (e.g., Fournier et  al. 2018; Hudson et  al. 2019; Barraqué and Moatty 2020). The 
French solidarity insurance system, although very inclusive, with a more than 95% penetra-
tion rate, seems unintentionally to have played a negative role in resilience by blocking the 
possibility of a BBB culture (Barraqué and Moatty 2020). In addition, according to Bar-
raqué and Moatty (2020), the refunds received by disaster victims cover the actual damages 
incurred, but numerous other aspects, such as damage to outdoor housing or non-monetary 
impacts (e.g., emotional), are not taken into account. According to the Ministry of Environ-
ment report (2019), insurance companies refund on average €500 million for flood disas-
ters every year, and the October 2015 event alone generated approximately €650 million 
damage, which represents a substantial financial blow to the insurance mechanism. A very 
high number of insurance claims (approximately 60,000) were registered, 60% relating to 
housing damage, 30% to cars, and 10% to business. The extended impacts of this event 
underlined the need for crisis units deployed in the field to deal directly with claims, as 




2.3.4  Persisting flood disasters after 2015
After the October 2015 Côte d’Azur disaster, a number of preventative measures were put 
in place by the government (Table 1).
Despite persistent government efforts, the impacts of flood events in the region do not 
appear to have lessened over time, and heavy rainfall events continue to cause loss of life 
and induce important material and immaterial damages. According to Météo-France,2 17 
notable rainfall events took place in PACA between the October 2015 event and January 
2020, leading to 14 flood deaths. Two recent events, November 22–24, 2019 and December 
1, 2019, accounted for 11 of the victims and also caused serious material damage. Accord-
ing to the French Insurance Federation (Fédération Française d’ Assurance, or FFA),3 the 
costs of these two disasters total €390 million, while 57,000 insurance claims were regis-
tered (54% relating to damage to housing, 12% to cars, and 34% to businesses).
Similar scales of loss have been experienced in the Riou de l’Argentière drainage basin. 
The stream that burst its banks during the 2015 event did so again in 2019 causing damage 
to the same locations, while several protection dikes around the flooded area failed. This 
triggered protests from local inhabitants in Mandelieu-la-Napoule, as reported on France 
3 news on December 1, 20194 and September 6, 2020.5 In addition, the retention ponds 
promised after the 2015 disaster had still not been installed in several locations—they are 
Table 1  List of improvements of preventative measures put in place in affected areas after the October 2015 
disaster
Structural measures Several rehabilitation works around the area, including the creation 
of a hydraulic model and the stabilization of riversides
Dam repairs: waterproofing renovated, cracking indicators installed, 
and damaged structures repaired
Addition of flood defenses in several municipal buildings
Alert system Improvement of the alert system, making it capable of receiving 
more than 1,400 emergency calls
Information, training and stakeholders Distribution of 2,000 flyers in the riskiest areas of the municipality
A yearly flood awareness day
Open tools and applications Creation of a mobile App (#MyPredict) for the estimation of risk 
from weather forecasts and the management of flood warnings
Purchase of 3D mapping tools and satellite phones by municipali-
ties
General administrative measures Removal of 50 tons of natural and anthropogenic waste from the 
valley and waterways and approximately 400,000  m2 of river-
banks cleaned
Revision of the PPRi, adding three hazard zones
Creation of nine new PAPI projects
2 http:// pluie sextr emes. meteo. fr/ france- metro pole/- Evene ments- memor ables-. html.
3 https:// www. ffa- assur ance. fr.
4 https:// franc e3- regio ns. franc etvin fo. fr/ prove nce- alpes- cote-d- azur/ intem peries- vaucl use- bouch es- du- 
rhone- var- toujo urs- vigil ance- orange- inond ation- 17569 57. html.
5 https:// franc e3- regio ns. franc etvin fo. fr/ prove nce- alpes- cote-d- azur/ alpes- marit imes/ mande lieu- napou le- 
riou- peur- 18699 40. html.
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now estimated to start functioning in 2023 (see France-Digues, December 9, 20196). In 
2018, Bokhove et al. (2019) conducted several workshops with local citizens at the River 
Brague in Biot, where residents asked for more flood retention measures. Furthermore, the 
CEREMA report (2019) illustrates that only 2% of the total population uses the #MyPre-
dict app, which alerts people to flooding, underlining the need for better communication 
from those responsible for flood governance.
In October 2020, another flood event occurred. According to the FFA and CCR (2020) 
press releases, this event triggered 14,000 insurance claims with a total cost of €210 mil-
lion. Again, most damage was done to housing (72%), followed by businesses (25%) and 
cars (3%); nine people died. These recurring disasters in the PACA region underline the 
need for new policies to be put in place. The Architectural Association of Côte d’Azur 
(Syndicat des architectes de la Côte d’Azur) suggested a new way of reducing flood risk, 
starting by adopting a BBB approach that strictly avoids the areas identified as potentially 
or previously flooded in the PPRi (Le Moniteur 2020).7 Carrega and Michelot (2021) sug-
gest that the PPRi of Saint-Martin-Vésubie offers exact mapping of floodplain limits and 
the two rivers (the Boréon and the Vésubie) that pass either side of the village. Neverthe-
less, it should be emphasized that in the village area the so-called danger zones sometimes 
extend beyond the floodplain and that the October 2020 floods overflowed from the flood-
plain in numerous locations, enlarging the main channel of the Vésubie. To examine the 
erosion processes in the drainage basin, which are important for anticipating future risks 
and taking preventative measures, we obtained six 3  m-resolution PlanetScope satellite 
scenes covering the Vésubie drainage basin. The images were atmospherically corrected 
and with no to low cloud (5 scenes 0% cloud, 1 scene 12% cloud). In Table 2, we provide 
the metadata for the six PlanetScope scenes.
Next, we calculated the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) for each pixel of 
the satellite scene as described in Eq. (1), where NIR is the near-infrared band and R is the 
red band in each satellite image.
We then created an NDVI difference map (using the NDVI imagery from before and 
after the event) to assess where storm-related changes took place (Fig. 3). The incidence 
angle, illumination azimuth angle, and spacecraft view angle between the two image sets 
have caused shadow effects leading to some false positives in the image (see Plekhov and 
Levine 2018, for similar issues). Nevertheless, the differences in the main channel of the 




7 https:// www. lemon iteur. fr/ artic le/ il- est- evide nt- qu- il- ne- sera- pas- possi ble- de- recon strui re-a- l- ident ique- 
arnaud- reaux- croa- paca. 21122 89.
 https:// www. lemon iteur. fr/ artic le/ la- seule- solut ion- pour- faire- face- aux- pheno menes- extre mes- est- de- ne- 
pas- etre- sur- le- chemin- de-l- eau- annick- mievre- agence- de-l- eau. 21112 19.




































































































































































































































































Fig. 3  Map of the erosion effects and extended flood limits of the event on October 3, 2020. a Location 
map, Vésubie drainage basin; b NDVI difference map—the higher the difference in NDVI, the greater the 
impact of the flood. Very high values appear in the Vésubie channel; c The village of Saint-Martin-Vésubie 
before the event September 13, 2020; d The village of Saint-Martin-Vésubie after the event, October 10, 
2020—notice significant excess sedimentation in the main channel of the Vésubie
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3  Lessons for French flood risk governance: a SWOT analysis
In this study, we illustrate, through an analysis of flood disasters in the PACA region, that 
the extent of flood damage and disaster insurance claims in PACA have not decreased over 
time. Furthermore, flood risk culture seems to be addressed at the individual rather than 
the collective (municipal) level. Finally, there has been no significant investment in vulner-
ability reduction and resilience building (e.g., BBB programs, managed retreat). Building 
on this case study, it is timely to analyze the main strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
Fig. 4  SWOT analysis of the French FRG
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and threats that concern the French FRG system (Fig. 4) to identify any shortcomings and 
suggest future improvements. To do this, we follow the approach used in past research 
(e.g., the European STAR-FLOOD project), which provided SWOT analysis for individual 
national FRG systems, such as the UK and Belgium (e.g., Alexander et  al. 2016; Mees 
et al. 2016).
The first strength observed in the French system is the existence of an important number 
of prevention mechanisms and legal tools, such as the PPRi and the PAPI, discussed in 
Sect. 2. This legal robustness is further underlined by constitutional principles of national 
solidarity to cope with disasters, and the image of the central state as the guardian of pub-
lic safety, which is largely shared by the public (Fournier et  al. 2018). For example, the 
hazard and vulnerability mapping provided by the PPRi is an important tool for decision 
makers and is easily accessible by the public through mobile applications, etc. In addi-
tion, the combination of PPRi mapping and detailed information about damage provided 
in post-event reports can provide useful material for evaluating the efficiency of the PPRi 
and PAPI. On the other hand, these well-defined prevention mechanisms have a drawback, 
since they need constant updating, which in some cases is not done on time due to lack of 
funds or personnel (e.g., after the 2015 disaster in Cannes it was found that the most recent 
PPRi had been approved in 2003). For example, a significant number of French pension-
ers choose to purchase housing and spend their retirement time in PACA with no previ-
ous knowledge of flood risk; they are therefore likely to be unaware of the likelihood that 
their house is in a high flood hazard zone. To optimize these prevention mechanisms in 
the future, decision makers will have to take into account the increasing concentration in 
urban centers as well as the impacts of climate change on hazard behavior (e.g., flood fre-
quency and severity). As Dubert et  al. (2016) explain, most exposed municipalities and 
municipalities with a high number of fatalities all have approved PPRis. Nevertheless, 
some highly exposed municipalities have an outdated PPRi (older than four years at the 
time of an event) or no PPRi at all. This also occurs in other regions of France, as Douvi-
net et al. (2011) illustrate with their example of La-Faute-sur-Mer, where 100 houses were 
built after 2000 and were flooded in 2010. The PPRi for La-Faute-sur-Mer, showing that 
the houses were built in a high-risk area, only received final approval in 2007. Further-
more, during the June 2010 Draguignan disaster, 22% of residential buildings were located 
in a flood risk zone and approximately one in three employees were commuting into the 
flood risk zone for their work, increasing the economic cost of the disaster (INSEE 2018). 
Guillier et al. (2016) recommend the inclusion of the PAPI in the governance framework, 
since it is currently missing from around 50% of high flood risk areas (Territoires à risque 
important d’inondation, or TRI): they believe that this absence could be due to the lack 
of robust government services at a local level or the non-prioritization of flood risk in the 
development of these areas.
The second strength of the French FRG is the significant insurance penetration rate 
(approximately 95%) due to a direct purchase requirement. This can be considered as 
welfare-enhancing, as it improves financial coverage against disasters (e.g., Hudson et al. 
2019). Furthermore, the Ministry of Ecological Transition report (2020) announced that 
the role of the state in the CatNat insurance scheme will be reinforced by recentralizing 
financial activities which will add support to the management of these funds from the pub-
lic reinsurer, the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance. The report also underlines that comple-
mentary funding will be provided to tackle flooding (after the repeated disasters in PACA 
in the previous 10  years). Despite these important developments, the French solidarity 
insurance scheme seems to suffer from several weaknesses. First, the current market struc-
ture could be unsuitable for coping with future increases in flood risk due to insufficient 
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incentives for risk reduction. By funding properties and locations that are damaged repeat-
edly by flooding, insurance is incompatible with a BBB logic, limiting the capacity for 
resilience. As the EU Floods Directive (2007) suggests, reducing flood risk by reducing 
hazard, vulnerability, and exposure must be the objective. According to Kron et al. (2019), 
if insurance receives the residual risk, which is difficult to control through structural and 
non-structural measures, it can play the role of a lever for policy improvement. Second, 
in some cases victims of a severe climate-related disaster do not even know if they are 
covered by the CatNat system. This has been the case for agricultural producers experienc-
ing heavy hailstorms, which are not covered by CatNat.8 In France, there is no empirical 
information on voluntary flood insurance purchases since the French solidarity framework 
is compulsory, while risk estimation seems to be based only on declared damages, limiting 
the capacity for risk reduction. It is now feared that repeated flood disasters due to climate 
change could lead to the dissolution of flood insurance, which is the main threat for the 
future if the framework remains stagnant (Lamond and Penning-Rowsell 2014). As Douvi-
net and Vinet (2012) indicate, a major disaster (costing more than €10 billion) would make 
the CatNat system move toward increasing premiums or deductibles by all possible means. 
A third weakness of widespread insurance for well-delimited flood hazards is that it gener-
ates moral hazard—that is, the incentive to increase exposure to risk because the individual 
will not bear the full cost of that risk (e.g., Lamond and Penning-Rowsell 2014). This is 
not the case for other natural hazards, like earthquake, where location predictions are less 
straightforward (Nguyen and Noy 2019). Past research points to a more flexible system 
with increased PPP (keeping penetration rates as high as possible) and more funding for 
reducing vulnerability and improving resilience through BBB (e.g., Fournier et  al 2018; 
Hudson et al. 2019; Kron et al. 2019).
The third strength of the system is the high expertise and know-how of public services. 
France has a long tradition of hazard and vulnerability mapping as well as expert govern-
ment engineering services (Larrue et  al. 2016; Fournier et  al. 2018). The country has a 
transparent system in that issues are clearly reported in government documents in post-
event reports (e.g., the Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes report 2016), which are concise and 
distributed in the public domain. Nevertheless, this high degree of specialization is coun-
ter-balanced by a lack of synergy between actors and stakeholders in the three main phases 
of the FRG cycle (risk prevention, emergency management, and disaster recovery—see 
Fig. 1). As an example, there is an observable a lack of appropriate training and informa-
tion for response teams on the ground and emergency services, such as firefighters, are 
obliged to rely on the protocols for other natural disasters (e.g., forest fires or earthquakes). 
Moreover, there is a lack of communication between actors in the different steps (prepa-
ration, control, organization, etc.) of the three main phases of the cycle (risk prevention, 
emergency management, and disaster recovery). For example, we see a failure of commu-
nication between meteorological (rainfall) model specialists and alert system experts (Car-
rega 2016) in numerous examples described in Sect. 2.3 Poor communication has played 
a significant role globally in past major disasters. Cyranoski (2011) observed that during 
the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan a warning system based on initial seismic signal 
predicted a limited region of intense shaking. As a result, the risk of tsunami was heav-
ily underestimated, and local people and emergency services did not respond at maximum 
alert. The actual shaking was far more severe and widespread.
8 https:// www. publi csenat. fr/ artic le/ parle menta ire/ catas troph es- natur elles- le- senat- veut- refor mer- le- syste 
me-d- indem nisat ion.
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The fourth strength of the French FRG is the well-defined spatial scale (i.e., drainage 
basin) at which flood risk management is undertaken. This was implemented for the first 
time after 2007 to transpose the EU Floods Directive into French law (Larrue et al. 2016). 
The study of flood risk in drainage basins brings some important benefits, especially for the 
analysis of flood hazard, since the rapid accumulation of runoff (following heavy storms) 
can be controlled upstream from the catchment area (e.g., riparian zone management). In 
addition, wetland areas within the basin can be studied and preserved as non-structural 
anti-flooding measures. With this in mind, river contracts were created. These bring 
together various partners (the Préfet of the department, water agencies, and other local 
authorities) focusing on a set of common goals ranging from management of water quality, 
enhancement of the aquatic environment and water resources, to defense against flooding. 
The PAPI are also designed on a drainage basin scale and must combine measures and sug-
gestions for improving knowledge, monitoring and forecasting, information, planning, pro-
tection works, reduction of vulnerability (of buildings), crisis management preparedness, 
and feedback on operations (Larrue et al. 2016). Studying floods on a drainage basin scale 
presents opportunities for the French FRG, including the potential to monitor the effects of 
existing prevention approaches at a regional or municipal scale. Nevertheless, the drainage 
basin scale also has weaknesses. First, it is not easily understood by non-experts and sec-
ond, it provides a false perception that risk is limited to flood hazard areas. This limits the 
capacity to reduce vulnerability in areas that could suffer indirectly from flooding issues, 
for example, a municipality outside the flooding zone, many of whose residents could work 
in flood-prone areas and would suffer indirect economic impacts. Since 1982, a decentrali-
zation process has led to the transfer of responsibilities from central government toward 
local authorities (Kaufmann and Wiering 2017), with the aim of creating command and 
response units for flood disasters at a local level and adapted to different types of flooding 
(e.g., Mediterranean flash floods, fluvial floods in northern France). This decentralization 
can create important disparities in public funding between municipalities. For example, 
despite repeated flooding (2015, 2019, 2020) in the Riou de l’Argentière drainage basin, 
the local government has not focused on improving resilience or allocated any funding to 
the relocation of constantly damaged elements. In contrast, as Heinzlef et al. (2019) indi-
cate, the city authorities in Avignon have demanded increased resilience planning for fre-
quently flooded areas and placed the city under a pilot study. Arnaud-Fassetta et al. (2009) 
emphasize that, for every drainage basin, flood-intense periods over past centuries and their 
characteristics must be studied and compared to recent decades to observe abnormalities 
and explanations for current disasters. Nevertheless, this does not always happen, leading 
to myopic assessments that focus only on recent flooding (over the past 30 years).
The fifth strength that we identified in the French FRG system is that a significant num-
ber of government services participate in shaping flood governance protocols. As Kauf-
mann and Wiering (2017) explain, managing flood risk is conceived as a collective task. 
Fournier et al. (2018) illustrate the numerous instruments and institutions that participate 
in tackling flooding in the country (e.g., CEREMA, DREAL, local prefecture experts, min-
istries), meaning that a large number of specialists are focused on preventing flood dis-
asters and alerting local populations. This is also evident in the large number of research 
programs and amount of funding directed toward flood governance, flood hazard, and risk 
modelling (e.g., Boudou et al. 2016; Montané et al. 2017; Liefferink et al. 2018). Other pos-
sibilities for the participation of government services in flood governance protocols are the 
application of corrective measures (see Table 1, after the October 2015 disaster in PACA) 
and the desire to improve the system, evident in the transparent official post-event reports 
available in the public domain (e.g., Préfet of Alpes-Maritimes report 2016). Nevertheless, 
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due to a “state covers all” logic, participation from local populations is minimal, which 
does not help to improve resilience. For example, only one flood awareness day per year 
was planned in PACA after the October 2015 disaster. Ideally, region-wide workshops con-
sidering all three phases of the cycle (risk prevention, emergency management, and disas-
ter recovery) should be held, and explanatory flyers should be tailored to the needs of each 
municipality. These would help shape the local population’s perception of risk, poor under-
standing of which is another threat to the French FRG system. It seems that institutions and 
government do not always encourage citizens to participate in decision-making processes, 
while support for individual measures that would increase resilience is still lacking (Moatty 
et al. 2018). According to the IRSN (2020), despite the alarming impacts of climate change 
on flood frequency and severity, the French population’s perception of flood risk has not 
changed much since 1997. Around 40% consider the risk to be high, 40% consider it to 
be medium, and 20% consider it to be low. In addition, even though flooding is by far the 
costliest natural disaster in France, the population feels confident that state services pro-
vide greater protection from flooding than from other risks, like pesticides, terrorism, or 
environmental pollution. Local social services should participate in the framework by con-
ducting vulnerability analyses for criteria that have played a crucial role in past disasters. 
For example, during the Var flash floods in 2011, seven of the 13 victims who died in their 
own home were aged over 80, indicating that the age criterion should be considered for 
future studies (Vinet et al. 2012). Sassi (2011) provided a monetary evaluation of damages 
induced by a December 2003 flood event in PACA. Apart from this attempt, to our knowl-
edge no other modelling studies evaluate the economic impacts of flood events in the area. 
We assume that insurance companies could have more knowledge about this issue, but the 
fact that their data are confidential does not help to improve the current FRG framework. 
This is why increasing PPP, as suggested in previous research (e.g., Fournier et al. 2018; 
Hudson et al. 2019; Kron et al. 2019), might be mutually beneficial.
4  Conclusion
In this study, we perform an in-depth analysis of the French FRG framework (Fig. 1) using 
multiple sources (insurance datasets, scientific articles, satellite data, and grey literature) 
to (1) analyze modern flood disasters in the PACA region; (2) discuss the efficiency of 
French public policy instruments; (3) perform a SWOT analysis of the French FRG; and 
(4) suggest improvements. Our analysis shows that despite the application of costly new 
structural and non-structural measures from the government (following the October 2015 
disaster), the impacts of flood events in the region do not appear to have lessened over time 
and consecutive events have led to 23 more flood fatalities. Since flood hazard is predicted 
to intensify, due to climate change, the situation demands improvements in the French FRG 
approach to avoid further major disasters. The key findings of this paper illustrate that, 
despite its numerous strengths, the French FRG could benefit from several improvements. 
These include: (1) regular updates of risk prevention plans and tools (e.g., PPRI, PAPI); (2) 
the adoption of a BBB logic rather than repairing damage in the same locations; (3) tak-
ing undeclared damages into account in flood risk models (not just those declared to flood 
insurance); (4) increased communication between actors at all the different steps in each 
cycle (preparation, control, organization, etc.); (5) increased communication between the 
three main phases of the cycle (risk prevention, emergency management, disaster recov-
ery); (6) an approach that extends the risk analysis outside the borders of the drainage basin 
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(to be used in combination with current basin risk models); and (7) increased participation 
in FRG by the local population.
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